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 THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF POTENCY:
 A SYNTHETIC PRESENTATION
 IN TERMS OF "ACTIVE" AND "PASSIVE"
 Sommarium. - Sicut primarie dividitur ens in actúale et potentiate , sic radicalissime
 distinguitur ens potentiate in potentiam activam et potentiam passivam ; in quas duas viden-
 tur possi reduci omnes modi potentialitatis qui tractantur apud S. Thomam. Quondam autem
 « relativitas » invenitur in determinatione potentialitatum formae substantialis atque voluntatis
 humanae angélicaeque.
 In St. Thomas' formulation, the study of potency is one of the most im-
 portant prerequisites to a study of being. And the reason for this is that the
 only being we have immediate experience of, is created being: and created
 being is necessarily potential being - i. e., in some way falling short of complete
 perfection, and of perfect actuality. To understand potency, therefore, is
 to understand the proper characteristic of created being. Even the " potency "
 of God is essentially related to our understanding of the potency of created
 being. God is " potential ", i. e., the Omnipotent Creator, quoad nos , only
 because we are potential in respect to Him, i. e., created by Him. We are
 moved to posit the power and superiority of God as Creator, precisely because
 we perceive the contingent and dependent powers and capacities of creatures. 1
 And so potencja in God is neither an imperfection nor a limit, but rather the
 unlimited creative power of God's essence, i. e., its perfect actuality.
 We arrive at the concept of the " potency " of God only through abstraction
 from the potencies of creatures. Indeed, we could know neither God nor His
 potency, unless we examine created beings and their potencies as a preliminary.
 And it follows from this that the " potency " in God is not predicated of Him
 as if in contradistinction to actuality: but only by way of eminence - i. e.,
 in so far as he contains in a pre-eminent way all created (potential) perfections
 and potencies. God's potency, therefore, is a paradox : It is fully actual potency;
 and is, indeed, identical with His fully actual essence. 2 In creatures, on the
 hand, it is truly a " potential " potency.
 In view of the importance of potency in via inventionis for the understand-
 ing of both created and uncreated being, we might say that the most important
 division of being is the division into actual and potential being. For this
 1 Cf. I De Pot., q. 1, art. 1.
 2 Cf. Ibid.
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 division truly and radically sets off created from uncreated being. And it is
 only by the creation of complex being (i. e., being composed from potency
 and act) that beings have become multiplied, and hence divided. All the
 divisions and distinctions which we ascribe to being would be neither possible
 nor intelligible unless there were some primordial complexification of being.
 Let us conduct our inquiry into St. Thomas' general doctrine on potency,
 by first highlighting the distinction between actual and potential being, and
 then considering potency in its role as a principle of being.
 A. The Distinction of Actual from Potential Being.
 In the Aristotelian system, actual being, i. e., actual substance (ovolo)
 must somehow be prior in the universe considered as a whole. 3 St. Thomas
 agrees basically with this, but adds that God is substance by way of eminence .
 It would, ideed, be more accurate to say that God is a super substance, a hy-
 perexistent, and that He contains the perfections of substantiality and esse
 in much the same way that man contains the perfections of plant life, i. e.,
 in a pre-eminent way. 4 To more clearly define what he means by the fully
 actual God who created all things, St. Thomas quotes from Chapter XI, 6,
 of the De Divinis Nominibus of Dionysius:
 We cannot say that the per se existent who is the cause of all things is some
 substance, whether angelic or divine: but must rather aver that the principle and
 the substantial ground and the cause of all the things which have been created
 in nature-is itself a veritable supersubstantial existent. 5
 St. Thomas, in commenting on this passage, concludes that this super-
 substantial esse of God is substance only in the sense that it is as it were the
 exemplar or form of all other substantial forms.
 It is perhaps even misleading for us to think of God as an essence or
 substance. For when we use such words we cannot help but visualize a recep-
 tacle or receptive potency. And there is nothing of receptivity in God. He
 is, indeed, unreceived esse, unreceptive essence. He is pure and simple and
 completely impassible: the final act, or actuation, to which all created passive
 potencies are somehow ultimately ordered. 6
 The created beings which are ordered to God in such manifold ways have
 one thing in common: They are all potential in some way, in that, although
 they already participate in a higher or inferior manner in the perfections of
 3 Cf. Metaph. XII, 1 e 6 (1069 a, 107 b, 3-6).
 4 Cf. De Subst. Sep., XVII, 93. A problem of terminology enters in here. If we wish
 to attribute substantiality and existence to creatures, then we are constrained to say that
 God has something more than this. It, on the other hand, we say that God is being and
 substance, we must, to be consistent and philosophically exact, say that all creatures are
 only quasi-beings, quasi -substances (i. e. having such names only by way of analogy).
 5 Cf. Ibid. : " Non enim substantiam quamdam divinam aut angelicam esse dicimus
 per se esse quod est causa quod sint omnia; solum enim - quod sint ex natura omnia -
 ipsum esse supersubstantiale.... est principium et substantia et causa ".
 6 Cf. In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1.
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 God, they are still intrinsically ordered either to further perfection, or to con-
 tinual preservation in the perfection which they have.
 Those beings which participate in the highest way in the actuality of God
 are the intellective substances. These intellective substance are subdivisible
 into: 1) those numerous incorporeal species which in popular terminology
 we designate as " angels, " and which are complete substances in full possession
 of both themselves and their thought; and 2) the species of man, whose soul
 is an incomplete substance which will attain to the full possession of itself
 and of its thought only if and when it comes to a state of full self-compre-
 hension in an immortal body, unsusceptible to further change or corruption.
 There are also other beings which participate in a minimal way in the
 supersubstantial actuality of God; which - in metaphorical terms - " have
 a long way to go " in attaining to such actuality; but which can indeed advance
 towards human intellective actuality according to a slow and ordered
 progression. 7 And these are the essentially material beings : i. e, beings
 whose substance could not exist in any way without matter. The potentiality
 of such beings is a progression towards actuality, a progression which is never
 quite complete, but always moving, always becoming. 8 And the potency
 of such material beings is called " prime matter, " i. e., that first substratum
 which must be presupposed as a receptacle for all essentially material forms,
 and also for the incomplete substantial form of man, which depends per accidens
 on a body for its complete perfection.
 B. Potency as a Principle of Being.
 Potency, whether it be found in material or in spiritual beings, is essentialty
 an ordering to act, a special finite mode or participation in the pure actuality
 of God. And, if we analyze the connotation of the word, " participation ",
 we will see that is at the same time both an affirmation and a negation: an
 affirmation, is so far as it designates a certain degree of positive actuality
 which is possessed; but a negation, in so far as it implies that there is some
 chasm - be it relatively great or small - between the perfection of the
 participant and unparticipated act.
 There is an evident, easily perceptible negation or privation implied in
 the "participation" of act on the part of generable and corruptible things:
 for they all have some kind of a limited form or act, which is able to be replaced
 by some other form; and the very phenomenon of change implies a privation,
 a negation, of the new form which is to be received.
 But there is also another, more metaphysical type of privation, and there-
 fore of participation, to be found in these same generable and corruptible
 beings: a metaphysical participation, a pure type of potency, a fundamental
 transcendent relationship which is found in every created being, whether
 7 Cf. In XII Metaph., lect. II, p. 624 (edit. Parma): " Licet.... materia prima sit in po-
 tentia ad omnes formas, tarnen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia
 ad formas elementares, et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones commixtionum
 est in potentia ad diversas formas ".
 8 Cf. Abist., Physics , VIII, 5, 257 b, 7-9: The potential is in process to actuality and
 motion is an incomplete actuality of the movable.... ".
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 material or spiritual. As St. Thomas says, even in corporeal generation some
 deeper type of potency is necessary over and above matter:
 Over and above this transistory mode of becoming, it behoves us - if we are to
 follow the opinion of Aristotle and Plato - to designate another, more fundamental
 type.... That is to say, over and above that mode of becoming by which something
 is generated when a new form is united to the matter - we must presuppose another,
 more fundamental generation of things, according to which existence itself is
 infused to the whole universe of creatures from that primary being who is existent
 of His very nature. 9
 This fundamental deprivation of existence in itself , which gives to a thing
 the metaphysical possibility for receiving existence ab alio - is called in
 Thomistic terminology, "essence". All existing creatures, in so far as they
 are created and participant, must have some a- temporal ground for receiving
 existence - a ground which becomes at the same time a mode of expressing
 existence. And " essence " supplies such a ground.
 This essence, indeed, gives complete metaphysical shape, and possibility
 of existence, to a thing. And nothing would be able to exist, unless it had
 the intrinsic form of transcendent potentiality which its essence gives it.
 However, we must not make the mistake of supposing that essence actually
 causes the existence of something, instead of vice versa. Essence has no casual
 relationship to the existence it " receives, " except a purely material one.
 In fact, as St. Thomas notes in the De Ente et Essentia , 10 we can easily think
 of some essence without knowing anything about whether one actually exists,
 or not. This is because of our human, analytic habit of breaking things up
 into their intelligible parts, and then starting from the bottom, so to speak,
 in the didactical reconstructions which we make of reality. But our recons-
 tructions will never represent an actual thing in rerum natura , unless there is
 a final mental addition of the actus ultimus , the form of forms and act of all
 acts, i. e., the act of existence itself, or esse.
 In a composite essence, the matter is not existentially actuated by the
 form, except on condition that the form is itself made real and actual by the
 actus essendi. A similar relationship to the actus essendi is found in the case
 of angels, who, though they may be said to " be " their own form, yet cannot
 be said to be their own existence. As St. Thomas states in the Summa Contra
 Gentiles.
 We find in the angels a composition, in that their existence is not identical
 with their quiddity [quod est].... We have already shown that God is His own
 subsistent existence. Nothing, therefore, besides God, can be its own existence;
 it follows consequently, that in every created substance, the substance is one thing,
 while the existence of the substance is quite another. 12
 9 De Subst. Sep., Ch. IX, 48: " Ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est secundum senten-
 tiam Piatonis et Aristotelis ponere alium altiorem.... Oportet.... supra modum fiendi quo
 aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod
 esse attribuitur toti universitāti rerum a primo ente quod est suum esse ".
 10 De Ente et Essentia, IV.
 11 De Ente, IV.
 12 S. C. O., II, 52: " Invenitur in eis aliqua compositio, ex eo quod non est idem in
 eis esse et quod est.... Ostensum est quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud
 praeter Ipsum potest esse suum esse; oportet igitur in omni substantia quae est praeter
 Ipsum, aliud esse ipsam substantiam et aliud ejus esse ".
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 However, in the angels, as well as in the most inferior material substance,
 the actus essendi is not self-sufficient; but must, for its explanation and very
 possibility, presuppose some type of " pure " potency, some " material " for
 the reception of the act.
 And so we see that " potency " in its most abstract and essential sense
 is the material principle which makes finite existence itself possible. We shall
 see in the following section how it also corresponds in a derivative sense to
 other acts, or perfections, or aspects of perfections - than the actus essendi
 itself.
 C. The Primordial Types of Potency - Active and Passive Potency.
 St. Thomas, in the beginning of his De Potentia Dei, differentiates for us
 the two fundamental divisions of potency:
 There is a twofold division of potency : 1) active potency, which is the prin-
 ciple of that act which is called ' operation ' ; .... and 2) passive potency, which is
 the principle of the first act, or form, of a thing. 13
 St. Thomas goes on to say14 that active potency is the cause of all the
 " actions ", or operations, which are elicited from an individual existent: and
 that passive potency is the cause of all the passivities and " passions " in a
 thing. He remarks that our notion of " potency " is derived from a considera-
 tion of act, and that we start out in via inventionis in ascribing potency to the
 most overt operations, and finally end up in positing it as the purely passive
 principle of the most convert " operation " - namely, of the form and sub-
 stantial act of a thing (and thus this latter division of potency is truly,
 as we remarked above, 15 potency in the most abstract and essential sense,
 potency par excellensce).
 An understanding of active and passive potency is of paramount impor-
 tance for the whole of Thomistic ontology. The reason for this is that the
 relationship of active to passive potency within a particular being or between
 one being and another - serves to establish this or that individual being in
 its peculiar and proper analogical status, within the whole hierarchy of crea-
 tion. And all the perfections of a particular being are proportionate to this
 ontological status within the realm of being.
 Our next consideration, therefore, in this analysis of the general Thomistic
 formulation of the doctrine on potency, will be given to the precise scope
 and extent of these fundamental types of active and passive potency.
 1) The Scope and Existential Ramifications of " Active Potency ".
 The operations produced naturally by a being are called by St. Thomas
 the " act of that which is perfect ", or the " act of a being in act ".
 13 Loc. cit., 1, c: " Duplex est potentia: una activa cui respondet actus qui est operatio;
 alia est potentia passiva, cui respondet actus qui est forma ".
 14 Ibid.
 15 Sect. B, ad fin.
This content downloaded from 
             134.48.29.84 on Mon, 28 Sep 2020 16:59:07 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF POTENCY 313
 For example, the operation by which a separate substance applies its will
 to various intelligible species would be such an " act of a being in act ". 16
 This terminology is meant to differentiate such operations from mere transient
 motion, which is properly called the " act of being in potency ", i. e., an act
 not flowing in the natural order from some state of actuality which a being alrea-
 dy has, but infused into some " pure ", i. e., completely passive, potency. 17
 The potencies which correspond to such operations, i. e., the « potencies
 of beings in act ", are the so-called " active powers " of beings. In created
 beings, these active powers are characterized as accidental perfections, in the
 second species of the accident of quality: ontological qualities which effectively
 bridge the gap between a substance and its own operations. 18 They must be
 attributed to all creatures, precisely because creatures are unable to act im-
 mediately through their substantial forms. 19 (In God, on the other hand,
 who is able to act immediately through His simple and eternally active essence,
 active " power " becomes existentially identical with substantial act.).
 While active potency in God is synonymous with the infusion of esse to
 all created potencies, and is, in its essence, a fait accompli , active potency in
 creatures is a means through which their perfection in accidental esse is ac-
 complished - a principle discernible by the human mind in its efforts to
 accurately describe the process which must take place for the production
 of any concrete act. 20 We must presuppose some such principle within the
 individual, if we are to attribute a concrete action to an individual as to its
 source, i. e., its spontaneous initiator. 21
 The power of action within a creature would seem to be able to be
 best described as the ability of a thing to accomplish its natural or freely
 intended end with a minimum of hindrance or obstacles. 22 For example, a
 powerful fighter would be able to obtain more by brute strength than another
 person. 23 But this power of action is neither self-sufficient nor self-explanatory.
 It must have a root, a rational ground, in the substantial act, in the form,
 of the individual creature. 24 As with every accident, it must be rooted in,
 and caused by, the substance of a thing. 25 And in the case of an intellective
 creature, we would have to say that the root of all such powers is the incom-
 plete substantiality of the soul as the active principle of the human essence 26
 (or, in the case of separate substances, the materially unlimited and uncom-
 posed substantiality of the separated form27).
 16 S. Th., I, q. 59, art. 1, ad 3.
 17 Cf. In III Phys ., Lect. Ill, init. It should be noted that, in Aristotle's formulation
 the form (first act) of a substance is also an " act of a being in potency ", in that the ge-
 neration of any substantial form is immediately reducible to the " primary " locomotion -
 i. e., the combination and separation of elemental particles. (Cf. Phys., VIII, 7 260 a, 29-
 260 b, 14).
 18 Cf. De Pot., I. q. I, art. 1.
 19 Cf. Ibid., ad. 11.
 20 S . Th., I, q. 41, art. 6, ad 1.
 21 S. C . G. II, 60: "Item. Sicut nihil.... ".
 22 In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1.
 23 Ibid .
 24 De Pot., art. I, c.
 25 De Ente, VI.
 26 De Virtute in Comm., I, 4, ad 3.
 27 De Subst . Sep., VIII, 45.
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 The form and substantial perfection of a thing might, therefore, be called
 its first and fundamental " principle of operations However, since the
 acts which can be produced by substantial forms are manifold, and since
 there is a certain natural succession among the posited acts themselves, we
 are led to discern different types of active potencies as immediately respons-
 ible for different " species " of operations.
 In the case of creatures, we examine the multiple operations of which
 they are capable, and the types of objects or concrete effects to which these
 operations must correspond or must be related; and we thus come to arrange
 the " active potencies " themselves in various genera and species. But in
 the case of God (in whom there can be no separation of operation and sub-
 stance) we are led to posit active potency from a study of His effects only, 28
 and not of His eternal operation. And from the knowledge of His unlimited
 effects and His universal providence, we rise to a rather tentative but none-
 theless certain knowledge of His eternally-active omnipotence. The proximate
 rational ground for this attribution of active potency to God seems to be the
 principle that " there must be an active potency corresponding to every passive
 potency ", 29 coupled with the realization that the whole universe of passive
 potencies, taken as a system, must correspond to some single, simple, and
 infinitely efficacious active potency. 30
 While the omnipotence of God is intelligible to us only through consideration
 of the dependent potency of the universe taken as a whole, the active potency
 of creatures becomes intelligible to us through the various types of operations
 and movements which take place in and among them.
 By consideration of the directly perceptible phenomenon of self-movement
 in living creatures, we easily arrive at the notion of the necessity for some
 active potential principle to supply the basis for such motions.
 The least perfect type of such self-movement is the phenomenon of growth
 and alimentation which is perceptible in all corporeal living beings, and to
 which we ascribe the corresponding active potency of " vegetation ". 31 The
 most advanced expression of such self-motion is the phenomenon of self-
 locomotion, which we perceive in animals which do not have their food
 immediately present to them (i.e., through the soil, etc.);32 and we corres-
 pondingly ascribe the potency of " locomotion " as the principle of such
 advanced movements. 33
 By consideration of other indirectly perceptible phenomena, we can also
 arrive at the notion of the existence of a purely immanent principle of activity,
 the active power of intellection. Our fundamental method in this case is the
 method of introspection. Using the data given to us through the common
 28 Cf. S. Th ., q. 25, art. 1.
 29 S. C . G., II, 22: "omni potentia(e) passiva© respondei potentia activa".
 30 Cf. In I Sent., d. 42. a. 1. a. 1.
 31 Cf. In II De Ànima, Lect. III, 256, 257; and In I De Anima , Lect. XIVM, 199.
 32 Cf. In VIII Phys ., Lect. XV, ad fin. " Probat quod.... also, I De Virt. in Comm.,
 art. III.
 33 Note that the potency of " locomotion " corresponds to a particular genus of operation,
 while the potency of " vegetation " expresses the common denominator " spontaneity "
 which is the modus operandi of all living things, qua living. Cf. In I De Anima, Lect. XIV,
 199-201; and In II De Anima, Lect. VI, 300.
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 sense, imagination, and memory, and seeing by reflection the " peripheral "
 activities of the passive intellect in the operations of the imagination we are
 led to seek for the sufficient reason of all such interiorly motivated movements.
 And we find such a sufficient reason only by positing a faculty in man which,
 though dependent on external objects and external stimuli as conditions for
 the movements which it causes, nevertheless its essence is autonomous. And
 this is the faculty of intellect. In lieu of this faculty, we would be absolutely
 without sufficient reason for the phenomena of abstraction and conceptuali-
 zation; for our experience shows that these latter operations are not directly
 proportionate to any external and material conditions which may give rise
 to them, but rather go beyond these conditions.
 Finally, seeing that the intellect is essentially autonomous, and only
 connected per accidens with the various concomitant phenomena which take
 place in man along with the more essential operations of these faculties, we
 come to realize that such a faculty can, and indeed must, exist in a pure state
 in some type of being. That is to say, there must be some type of being, or
 group of beings, which understand without depending on external objects or
 being subject to temporal progression. For, as St. Thomas says, " whatever
 exists per accidens in any nature, is not found in all instances of that nature " ; 34
 And he concludes that there must be some instance of the intellective nature
 in which intellection is found without the concomitant phenomena of abstrac-
 tion, temporal progression, etc., for
 in whatsoever genus is found an inferior exemplification of some perfection, there
 must be present, within that same genus, a specific type or instance of the pure
 and preeminent exemplification of that perfection. 35
 As the bed of an ocean is indisputably the sine qua non for all the fluctua-
 tions and alterations effected on its surface - so also passive potency is, in
 a very real way, the foundation for all the existential modifications which
 take place in, or through the agency of, a thing. Not only is passive potency
 directly responsible for all the " passivities " in a thing, i. e., for each and
 every way in which it is capable of receiving perfection : but it is also indirectly
 necessary as a substratum for active potencies, and all the operations to which
 these active potencies give rise. As St. Thomas says,
 In a thing which possesses active potency in a dependent way, there must be
 presuppossed some kind of passive potency to act as a receptacle for the active
 potency. 36
 34 Cf. S. Th., q. 51, art. 1, c. : " Quod accidit alicui naturae, non invenitur universaliter
 in natura illa ".
 36 Cf. Ibid.: 44 In quocumquo.... genere invenitur aliquid imperfectum, oportet praeexi-
 stere aliquid perfectum in genere ilio ". It should be noted that in the foregoing arguments
 St. Thomas uses the words, " nature " and " genus " as if he considered " intellective "
 and " non-intellective " as the fundamental genera dividing up all of being: so that, in this
 usage 4 4 rational animal " would not only be a species of material being, but, in a broader
 sense, a subspecies of the species of 44 intellective being " which itself could be relegated to
 the broader genus of potential, or created being.
 36 S . Th., Suppl. q. 35, a. 3 ad 1 (réf.: In IV Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, q. a 3): 44 In eo
 qui habit potentiam activam ab altero, praeexigitur ad potentiam activam potentia pas-
 siva quae recipere possit potentiam activam ".
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 It would be outside the scope of this paper to examine the nature of the
 proportion which exists between active and passive potency in separate sub-
 stances. Suffice it to say here that there can be no active potency which is
 not grounded in some way in passive potency - which gives it the very pos-
 sibility of existence. 37
 If we prescind from the order of metaphysical existence, and confine our-
 selves to the sphere of physical and phenomenal change, we find the paragon
 of passive potencies in this sphere to be prime matter. For our criterion
 in evaluating passive potencies is the relative type and perfection of act to
 which they are related. And prime matter is ultimately the capacity to receive
 all material forms, all corporeally receptible acts, provided only the proper
 material conditions obtain:
 Prime matter is in potency to all forms, but receives these forms only in a
 certain order: For before everything else it is in potency to the forms of the ele-
 ments; and then, passing through this state, becomes potential to the various
 other forms, according to the dispositions and relative proportions of those ele-
 mental forms which it already has. 38
 Prime matter is thus the most passive and potential entity in the physical
 sphere. However, if we look more closely at prime matter, we see that it is
 not pure passivity, pure potency. It is always part of a real, composite corpo-
 real essence; and therefore cannot even be thought of in abstraction from its
 real corporeal existence. I cannot think of " prime matter ", and at the same
 time entertain a doubt in my mind as to whether it has actual material existence ;
 for by definition, prime matter is a principle of actual corporeal beings. The
 size and type of corporeal being makes no difference. As long as there is one
 corporeal being of any description, it would be meaningless to talk about a
 " purely possible " prime matter, and to ask whether this potency has " yet "
 been actuated.
 However, if we transcend the physical realm of change and essential com-
 ponents, and pass to the sphere of metaphysical components, we find that
 we can ask such a question about the essence , taken as a whole. For example,
 as St. Thomas says in the De Ente et Essentia, Chapter IV, I can think of a
 " phoenix ", without knowing wheter one actually exists or not. I can
 abstract from the existence of an essence. The converse, of course, would
 not hold true: I could not consider " existence ", and wonder whether it has
 been determineed and made substantial. But such an abstraction would seem
 to be possible with regard to the essence.
 Essence, then, is the most ultimate of potencies, in that it is precisely
 that potency which corresponds to existence itself, to the first and ultimate
 act of the whole being, to the very act of the form. The " essential " characte-
 ristic of essence is that it be receptive of existence. In material things it is
 also subject to change: but this is not due to essence qua potential, but essence
 qua material.
 37 Cf. infra, pp. 318-319.
 38 In XII Metaph., Lect. II, p. 624 (edit. Parma): "Licet.... materia prima sit in
 potentia ad omnes formas, tarnen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in poten-
 tia ad formas elementares et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones comniixtio-
 num est in potentia ad diversas formas ".
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 Besides prime matter and essence, which are two facets of substantial
 passive potency, we can also distinguish various accidental passive potencies:
 To this category belong all those corporeal capacities or organs which render
 a corporeal being passive in the physical sense, i. e., capable of " further per-
 fection Thus the capacity of clay to take on new shapes, the capacity of
 the sense organs to receive concrete intentiones , the capacity of the sense
 appetites in man to be sublimated to the perfection of rational behavior
 through the vis cogitativa , would all be physical passive potencies. In addition
 to these physical passive potencies there are two instances of an accidental
 passive potency in the metaphysical order; namely, the possible intellect,
 which is potential to accidental existential perfection, but is situated outside
 the sphere of temporal change;39 and the will, which, as the "intellective
 appetite ", 40 is a " moved mover " directly under the jurisdiction of the
 " unmoved mover " among human faculties - the intellect. 41
 2) Comparison of Active with Passive Potency .
 Although it is necessary to use the word " potency " with reference to both
 active and passive types because of their de facto mutual inseparability, never-
 theless a certain ambiguity may result unless we clearly distinguish the precise
 way in which theyare related to one another.
 Active potency, in all its forms, seems always to presuppose some types
 of spontaneity, of self-motion, of self-determination. 42 Passive potency, on
 the other hand, seems to be always conditioned from without. 43 All the various
 types of passive potency seem to be dependent on external agents or external
 conditions for their actuation or for their perpetuation in act. For example,
 the passive intellect in the sensible part of man's soul " lies in wait " for the
 intelligible form given from "above"; the slab of marble "lies in wait"
 39 Cf. De Subst. Sep., XIX, 113.
 40 S. Th.. I. a. 81, a. 3. c.
 41 Ibid., q. 80, a. 2, c. This seems offhand to contradict St. Thomas' thesis that the
 operation of the will is the " act of a being in act " (S. Th., I, q. 59, art. 1, ad 3). But the
 contradiction disappears, if we consider the will with regard to the various domains which
 it affects or is affected by: In the domain of execution, the will is an active potency. In
 the domain of specification, however, the will is a passive potency; passive, that is, to the
 reception of ideas of goodness, or right and wrong, etc. from the intellect.
 St. Thomas could not, however, denominate these two aspects an " agent will " and
 a 44 possible will " - setting up a parallel with the case of the intellect. For the will is only
 active with regard to human activity, only passive with regard to the intellect. It is not
 a self contained totum of passivity/activity, as is the intellect.
 42 The 44 power " of an impermeable metal to withstand any hindrance or obstacle,
 which St. Thomas refers to in In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, would seem to be reducible to an
 accidental form consequent on particular matter (cf., e. g., De Ente et Essentia, 6, where
 St. Thomas speaks of such forms).
 43 For example, among the intellective powers the will, although it seems to possess
 a certain spontaneity with regard to external effects, control of bodily movements, etc., is
 " passive " in its own context, the context of spiritual potencies - since it must always
 be determined by the species of the possible intellect. Thus among the intellective powers
 there is only one 44 active " potency - the agent intellect which functions as an unmoved
 mover, as it were, in the realm of concepts and volition.
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 for the form which the sculptor is to give it. And ultimately, all that is material
 or potential is dependent on the active power of God, which either perfects
 or sustains it, both directly and through the agency of secondary causes.
 D. Subdivision of Active and Passive Potency.
 To conclude our discussion of these fundamental active and passive types
 of potency, let us examine some of the subtypes or aspects of potency, which
 St. Thomas mentions explicitly or implicitly, and which can be categorized,
 respectively, on the basis of their operative (active) or receptive (passive)
 orientation.
 1) Subdivisions of Active Potency .
 a) Universal potency may be ascribed to all those active potencies which
 are of higher, i. e. more eminent, gradation in the hierarchy of potential beings.
 Thus the angelic intelligence extends to all the objects which inferior intelli-
 gences encompass in their scope; and the active potency of God extends to
 all of creation, continually actuating it and conserving it in being. 44
 b) Exemplary potency is the power of some ideal prototype to serve
 as a model after which other things are subsequently or consequently fashioned.
 For example, an artifact is subsequent to an exemplar idea in the artist's
 mind ; and every created perfection is consequent upon the consummate per-
 fection of the Divine Word, which it mirrors in some finite way. 45
 c) Absolute potency is the active creative power of God, considered in
 precision from His will and wisdom, 46 insofar as it is absolutely capable of
 creating anything which is not self- contradictory, e. g. a winged horse.
 d) Ordered potency , on the other hand, is this same creative power of
 God, considered in its de facto union and identity with His will and wisdom. 47
 e) Natural potency is the self-sufficiency of natural powers to perform
 certain operations, without any special assistance in the supernatural order. 48
 For example, the agent intellect of man is self-sufficient to lead him to know-
 ledge in the light of first principles.
 2) Subdivisions of Passive Potency.
 a) Subjective potency is the capacity of an actually constitued substance
 to be perfected and completed by its accidents; for any such substance, consi-
 dered as a subject or substratum for accidents, is related to its accidents as
 potency to act. 49 This is not to say that there is any temporal sequence in
 44 S. Th., I, q. 57, art. 2.
 45 Cf. In I Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 1.
 46 S . Th., I, q. 25, art. 5, ad 1.
 47 Cf. Ibid.
 48 Cf. Ibid., III, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3.
 49 Cf. Ibid., I, q. 3, art. 6, c.
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 the perfection of a substance through its accidents : but only that the accidents
 of a being express fully those perfections which exist in only a "seminal"
 way in the substance. In the case of a man who becomes a doctor, for exam-
 ple, the new perfection which accrues to him is a result of the natural fulfill-
 ment of some capacity present in his particular essence: the progressions
 of time which takes place in the attainment of this perfection is only due to
 the exigencies of human nature, which requires a temporal unfolding of the
 material principle, for its perfection. In the angels, the full perfection of all
 " true " accidents (i. e., those which are predicable simpliciter) would seem
 to have taken place immediately (i. e., aeviternally) with their reception of
 their substantial esse. 50
 b) " Obediential potency " is a strictly theological term used to designate
 the capacity of creatures to be " raised above themselves " through the opera-
 tions of divine grace.
 c) " Positive " potency 51 is a term we might use to distinguish that
 material principle which, St. Thomas tells us, causes the existence of a thing
 by simply supplying a substratum for the form of that thing - as the mother
 supplies the raw material out which a human being is generated. 52 As applied
 to the sphere of strictly immaterial beings, the analogical " material " principle
 would be the essence, which is potential to the reception of esse. 53
 d) " Negative " potency , on the other hand, might be used to designate
 the privation of other forms, which is caused by the coadaptation of the ma-
 terial principle to the single form which it has. This privation causes a corres-
 ponding appetite or tendency in the material principle, to pursue other forms,
 which it does not have. 54 In the angels, who are immaterial and unchangeable
 essences, the analogous privation would not seem to be any dynamic principle
 of change, but simply of static non-identity ; 55 and there would be no corres-
 ponding natural appetite to possess all forms physically, but only the appetite
 to be united to all things intentionally, i. e., through knowledge. It seems
 to be of potency in this negative or privative sense that St. Thomas is speaking
 when he says, in the De Ente et Essentia , 56 that, as we move up the hierarchy
 of creatures, the superior beings have more act but less potency. For any
 increase in actuality implies a proportional diminution of limitations and
 privations.
 50 Although we can mentally distinguish a certain succession of natural and superna-
 tural beatitude, etc., this is not a temporal succession. Cf. S . Th., q. 62, art. 5, c and ad 2.
 51 Although St. Thomas does not use the adjective, " positive " and " negative ", as
 applied to potency, he does refer to potency -as- capacity in a twofold sense: sometimes
 in such a way as to emphasize that it is a capacity for some actuation, sometimes in such
 a way as to call attention to the fact that every actuated or fulfilled capacity excludes, of
 its very nature, certain privations (although it leaves room for other privations, i. e., other
 capacitie-for). In order to present the notion of potency-as-capacity with optimum clarity,
 it would seem useful to make explicit the distinction between these two aforesaid aspects.
 52 In I Phys., Lect. XV; "probat quod....".
 53 De Subst. Sep., VIII, 44.
 54 In I Phys., Lect. XV; " Ostendit idem....
 55 Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus (Tome 2, p. 101): Tot
 sunt praesentiae, quot formae praesentes, et similiter tot carentiae seu absentiae et priva-
 tiones, quot formae absentes ".
 66 De Ente et Essentia, IV.
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 Having completed the differentiation of potency according to the main
 senses in which it seems to be used by St. Thomas, we might note that all
 the above-mentioned sub-types and aspects of potency are applicable to se-
 parate substances; with the exception of Absolute and Ordered potency,
 which seem to be strictly applicable only to God ; and perhaps also of Exem-
 plary potency (St. Thomas seems to indicate that this latter is not attributable
 to separate substances simpliciter ).57
 We should also note that, when it comes to the question of actually ap-
 plying the " active " and " passive " categories to concrete cases, a certain
 relativity obtains. For example, substantial form is passive to the reception
 of esse, bit active in relation to prime matter; the agent intellect is " active "
 with regard to all other human faculties, but passive with regard to the illu-
 mination of faith, which requires an " obediential " capacity of the intellect
 as its prerequisite. But the cognition of these relativities is facilitated if one
 understands the fundamental distinction of active from passive potency - to
 which all other distinctions are subordinated - and which is itself the fun-
 damental " relativity ".
 Marquette University , Milwaukee , Wisconsin.
 Howard P. Kainz
 57 8. Th ., I, q. 55, a. 3, ad 1.
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